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Abstract
The Office of the United States Trade Representative, under the direction of President Donald Trump, has
implemented protectionist tariffs to an extent not seen in the past several decades. This paper explores data
from the U.S. Census Bureau to analyze how the values of U.S. imports and exports have differed from what
would have been expected for 2018 in the absence of tariffs. This is done by using past years’ data to create a
predictive curve for 2018 trade values across several different product categories, which have been subject to
tariffs. The general finding of this paper is that the U.S. trade deficit was smaller than predicted and that
imports from China were lower than would have been expected without the tariffs. This finding is generally
supported when looking at product categories. However, shrinking the trade deficit does not correlate with an
improved domestic economy or improved welfare for U.S. consumers.
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Introduction 
From the time he first hit the campaign trial in 2015, President Donald Trump has made it 
a priority to achieve better trade deals for the United States. Throughout his campaign, President 
Trump promised to renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement and reduce the trade 
deficit with China. Since taking office, President Trump has acted in various ways to achieve 
these goals. Notably, on the third day of his presidency in January 2017, he withdrew from the 
Trans Pacific Partnership; in October of 2018 NAFTA’s replacement, the United States-Mexico-
Canada Agreement, was finalized; he announced tariffs on steel and other products for all 
countries; and he implemented tariffs targeting China and other specific countries (Bown, Kolb). 
Many trade experts have criticized these decisions, stating that restricting trade would negatively 
impact the U.S. economy. However, given the ongoing nature of tariff implementation, the full 
economic impacts are still unclear.  
President Trump appears to follow a philosophy of mercantilism, in that he believes that 
improving the U.S. terms of trade will result in a stronger economy. President Trump fears the 
additional loss of jobs to outsourcing and offshoring, which he correlates with a growing U.S. 
trade deficit. These beliefs have fueled his protectionist policies (Ahmed, Bick).  
The return to protectionist policy under the Trump administration represented the largest 
implementation of tariffs by the U.S. since the 1930 Smoot-Hawley tariffs. The full effects of 
this unprecedented return to protectionism remain unknown due to the ongoing nature of the 
negotiations and tariff implementations. This paper represents an early quantification of the 
impacts of the Trump administration’s trade war on the total value of trade for the U.S. in 2018.  
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Review of Literature  
 While past research has been conducted on tariffs more broadly, and on trade with China, 
the most recent tariffs implemented under President Trump have not yet been fully investigated. 
Previous research has considered the question of whether tariffs cause a marginal impact on trade 
volumes. Debaere and Mostasharic look into this question in their 2010 paper entitled “Do tariffs 
matter for the extensive margin of international trade? An empirical analysis.” The paper 
considers the implications of tariffs and trade volumes between 1989 and 1999 for bilateral trade 
relationships between the U.S. and Mexico, China, and Canada. Debaere and Mostasharic find 
that the reduction in tariffs after World War II had a statistically significant effects on trade 
volumes and conclude that said reduction has contributed to trade growth (Debaere, Mostashari).  
 Previous research also considers U.S. trade relations specifically with China, which was 
the main target of the 2018 tariffs. Feenstra (1998) investigated the bilateral relationship and the 
determinants of the U.S. trade deficit with China. The early paper aimed to better quantify the 
U.S.-China trade deficit, as its exact value was uncertain at the time, and also to understand what 
caused the deficit to grow. The researchers concluded that the main contributors to the growing 
deficit were differing macroeconomic forces in the U.S. and China and the movement of 
production from the U.S. to East Asia (Feenstra, et al).  
 A later paper, from 2011, considers a similar topic — the gains and losses from trade 
retaliation between the U.S. and China. Dong and Whalley use numerical general equilibrium 
models of world trade to analyze the potential consequences of conflicts in bilateral trade 
relations. The paper finds that, in the case of a trade war between the U.S. and China, Europe and 
Japan would likely gain the most. Meanwhile, the conflict would hurt the U.S. if it loses markets, 
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 but there may be an optimal tariff that would benefit the U.S. However, the paper concludes that 
such a level is unlikely and that American and Chinese markets would suffer under trade 
retaliation due to loss of exports, worsened terms of trade, and domestic adjustment costs (Dong 
and Whalley).  
Most of the U.S. tariffs implemented on Chinese exports in 2018 were issued under 
Section 301 of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974 (other tariffs were imposed under other laws). In a 
1996 paper, Puckett and Reynolds examine this law from an international legal perspective to 
evaluate whether it is legal under World Trade Organization rules. The paper states that Section 
301 unfairly gives the U.S. the ability to unilaterally apply sanctions on any country that it 
perceives as imposing harm on U.S. exports. The paper suggests that if the WTO is to function at 
its peak and encourage maximum free trade, the U.S. must work within it and eliminate the 
Section 301 option (Puckett and Reynolds). 
 Looking at U.S. tariffs implemented under other laws, Ciuriak and Xiao (2018) quantify 
the impact of the Section 232 tariffs in their paper by using a Global Trade Analysis Project 
computable general equilibrium model, which integrates various accounts to provide a complete 
view of an economy. The results of their paper suggest that the steel and aluminum tariffs would 
restrict U.S. imports of the subjected goods and stimulate domestic production. However, the 
tariffs would also result in increased prices on the considered goods, which could undermine the 
global competitiveness of U.S. sectors that are dependent on steel and aluminum. The authors 
also note that, given the dynamic nature of the topic, the situation may change rapidly in the 
future (Ciuriak and Xiao).  
 A more comprehensive analysis of the trade war by Mary Amiti, Stephen J. Redding, and 
David Weinstein, focused on the impact of the Trump administration’s trade policies on price 
3
Murray: The Impact of 2018 Tariffs
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2018
 and welfare in the U.S. The paper finds that the U.S. experienced increases in the prices of 
intermediate and final goods in which the burden of the tariffs passed onto the domestic prices of 
goods. The paper concludes that the full weight of the tariffs fell onto the domestic consumer and 
resulted in a reduction of U.S. real income totaling $1.4 billion per month through the end of 
2018. The authors also find similar impact on foreign countries which issued retaliatory tariffs on 
the U.S. (Amiti, et al).  
 
Methods 
Rationale for Selection 
 I look at a variety of categories of import and export data sourced from the U.S. Census 
Bureau. Both import and export data are analyzed in order to provide a more complete 
understanding of how tariffs impacted the flow of goods. Looking at exports demonstrates how 
the U.S. has been impacted by tariffs implemented by other countries. The analysis of imports 
provides some insight into how the other countries’ producers have been affected by U.S. tariffs. 
Specifically, it could show whether tariffs caused U.S. consumers to source products from 
domestic producers due to increased costs from tariff-targeted countries, or whether instead U.S. 
consumers shifted from one tariff impacted country to a country that was not targeted by tariffs.  
 The data provided by the Census Bureau show values for imports, exports, and balance of 
trade. These baseline data are also adjusted in order to account for inflation and exchange rate 
fluctuation (U.S. Census Bureau). This adjustment by the Census Bureau does not take into 
account seasonal trends, on the product level, which I do in my analysis, but instead makes only 
minor changes to adjust for differences in valuation across the broader basket of goods. The 
Census Bureau defines imports as the Customs and Border Protection–appraised value of 
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 merchandise, or the price paid for merchandise for export to the United States, excluding: import 
duties, freight, insurance, and other charges incurred. Exports are valued at the free alongside-
ship value of merchandise at the U.S. port of export, which is based on the transaction price 
(including inland freight, insurance, and other charges incurred). 
 This analysis of imports and exports occurs across a range of categories. First, I look 
broadly at the U.S. balance of trade overall. This category compares the U.S. export and import 
volumes overall to what one would expect the 2018 export and import volumes to look like, 
absent tariffs — based on the model described below. I then also consider the balance of trade 
between the U.S. and China. Using the same analysis framework as for the overall balance of 
trade. China was selected because it was the main target of the U.S. trade war and faced the most 
tariffs with the most retaliation.  
 I then consider specific commodity categories. The same framework for analysis is used 
for agricultural products, automobiles, industrial supplies, and capital goods. Within these 
broader categories, I look individually at steel, aluminum, aircraft, and soy, all of which faced 
targeted tariffs. By looking at these specific categories of goods, I aim to demonstrate how tariffs 
have impacted the industries that, anecdotally, appear to face the greatest harm, based on news 
reports. 
 
Framework of Analysis 
I first analyze data from January 2013 to December 2017. This information is used to 
create an understanding of what a typical year of trade look like for the U.S., absent significant 
tariffs. By starting the analysis from this date, I am able to see the cyclical and seasonal trends 
that cargo volumes follow, which span across presidential administrations. This range of dates 
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 allows me to analyze five years of trade data. The five years of data are used to create a 
predictive curve that demonstrates what one would have expected trade volumes to look like in 
2018, had no new tariffs been introduced. I created a predictive curve by using a decomposition 
method to analyze the data, broken down across each category. Using this method, I find the 
seasonal index for each month and use that to deseasonalize the data across months. From these 
deseasonalized data, I find the overall trend year-over-year for each category. After quantifying 
the trends, I reseasonalize the data and create a predictive curve with the seasonal variations that 
forecasts the volumes in each category for 2018.  
From this predictive curve I measure how different the actual 2018 trade volumes are 
from the predicted trade volumes. This method does allow for some error in the prediction 
model, as the predictive curve is not perfectly precise. However, this model also allows for a 
more detailed level of prediction than a simple average of the previous year’s data, because it 
takes into account year-over-year trends.  
During this process I also create a timeline that illustrates the key dates when tariffs have 
been announced and implemented. I created this timeline from a combination of news reports 
and official U.S. and foreign documentation of tariffs. It is important to note the difference 
between the announcement and actual implementation because, once a tariff has been 
announced, there may be a market reaction to the tariff before levies are collected. After 
discovering the differences in 2018, I compare when those differences occur to the timeline of 
tariff announcements and implementations.  
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Results and Analysis 
Timeline of Tariff Announcements and Implementations 
 The first major tariffs announced under the Trump administration were safeguard tariffs 
imposed on $8.5 billion of solar energy cells at a 30 percent tariff rate and $1.8 billion of 
washing machines at a 20 percent rate for the first 1.2 million units, after which it rose to 50 
percent (Swanson, Plumer). This announcement followed a year of rhetoric from President 
Trump about decreasing the trade deficit, specifically with China. These tariffs were encouraged 
by U.S. washing machine manufacturers who requested help in curbing washing machine 
imports from rivals in Korea, and by solar cell manufacturers who also expressed support for the 
solar tariffs stating that imports of cheap solar cells were putting their companies at risk 
(Swanson, Plumer). Despite these requests, trade economists worried that the levies could drive 
up prices for consumers and hurt other American businesses. Around the time of this 
announcement, President Trump also stated that he was considering tariffs on steel and 
aluminum (Swanson, Plumer).  
 In February, China began investigating U.S. imports of sorghum, and announced the 
possibility of tariffs on $1 billion of trade in the form of antidumping and countervailing duties. 
This investigation came as part of a search for retaliation against the washing machine and solar 
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 cell tariffs. China chose to target the U.S. agriculture industry which relies heavily on exports to 
China (Bown, Kolb).  
On March 1, the USTR announced upcoming tariffs on all steel and aluminum imports 
across all countries (25 percent rate on steel and 10 percent rate on aluminum). Many economists 
stated that these tariffs would do little to revitalize the U.S. steel industry while imposing harm 
on the rest of the economy. Additionally, U.S. allies expressed their discontent with the tariffs 
and appealed for exemptions under threat of retaliation. In the following weeks, the U.S. granted 
temporary exemptions to the European Union and to partners in the North American Free Trade 
Agreement. The tariffs were officially implemented on March 23 under Section 232 of U.S. trade 
law, which permits tariffs when they are necessary for national security purposes (McBride).  
In April, China retaliated against the steel and aluminum tariffs and threatened additional 
tariffs on automobiles and agriculture. On April 17, China imposed the tariffs on U.S. sorghum 
and other goods at 15 to 25 percent rates, though these tariffs were later ended in May after 
negotiation. In reaction to China’s actions, the U.S. threatened to impose tariffs on an additional 
$50 billion in Chinese goods (Bown, Kolb). Through June, the U.S. and China continued to go 
back and forth in their threats, increasing the number of goods targeted to a value of more than 
$200 billion. The first of these tariffs were implemented in both countries on July 6. In the U.S., 
this featured $34 billion worth of tariffs under Section 301 at a 25 percent rate (Dollar). After 
this implementation, the U.S. again threatened an additional $200 billion in tariffs on Chinese 
goods. In August, the U.S. and China continued to increase their tariff threats by releasing new 
lists of goods that would be subject to tariffs. On August 23, both countries implemented their 
second round of tariffs targeting $16 billion worth of goods at a 25 percent tariff rate on both 
sides. In September, the U.S. announced and implemented an additional $200 billion in tariffs 
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 under Section 301 (Bown, Kolb). The tariffs were implemented at a 10 percent tariff rate with 
plans to increase that rate to 25 percent on January 1, 2019. The U.S. had a total of 
approximately $250 billion in tariffs on China, and Chinese tariffs on U.S. goods totaled nearly 
$110 billion with various rates on products ranging from 5 to 25 percent (Brew, et al).  
 The tariffs imposed under the Trump administration represent most the extensive trade 
protections since the 1930 Smoot-Hawley tariffs. China centered its tariffs on the U.S. 
agriculture and automobile sectors as well as on Boeing aircraft. Midwestern producers of 
soybeans and cars are among the most impacted by the tariffs. Meanwhile, the U.S. has focused 
its tariffs on the Chinese tech industry. However, many of these products are intermediate goods 
and therefore also have production components in other countries, which are then also affected 
by the tariffs. It is difficult to capture the full impact of the trade war due to these ripple effects.  
Finally, in December 2018, the U.S. and China announced a ceasefire in the trade war. Based on 
a verbal agreement, the U.S. would not implement the planned increase in tariff rate from 10 
percent to 25 percent in January. Additionally, China indicated it would increase imports of U.S. 
agricultural products and decrease tariffs on U.S. automobiles (Behsudi, Palmer, & Restuccia). 
As negotiations have continued, the outcome of an agreement (if there is one at all) remains 
uncertain. The U.S. is primarily concerned with the issue of intellectual property rights, 
specifically concerning technology. China currently requires foreign companies to share valuable 
information with Chinese partners in order to have access to the Chinese market. The U.S. aims 
to end these requirements and expand U.S. companies’ access to China.  
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Figure 1: Timeline of Tariff Announcements and Implementations 
   
2018 
Jan 
 Jan. 23: President 
Trump approves 
safeguard tariffs on 
$8.5 billion in solar 
panels and $1.8 
billion of washing 
machines 
 2018 
Feb 
 Feb. 5: China 
investigates 
antidumping and 
countervailing 
duties on $1 billion 
of U.S. sorghum 
 2018 
Mar 
 March 1: U.S. 
announces tariffs on 
steel and aluminum 
March 8-22: 
exemptions for EU 
and NAFTA 
partners 
March 23: tariff 
implementation 
           
2018 
Apr 
 April 2: China imposes 
retaliatory tariffs to steel 
tariffs 
April 3: U.S. threatens 
tariffs on $50 billion 
Chinese goods 
April 4: China threatens 
retaliation on auto and food 
April 17: China announces 
antidumping duties on U.S. 
sorghum  
 
 2018 
May 
 May 18: China 
ends sorghum tariffs 
after negotiations 
 2018 
Jun 
 June 1: U.S. ends steel 
tariff exemption 
June 15: U.S. and 
China both release 
revised tariff lists 
June 18: Trump asks 
for $200 billion more 
tariffs on China 
June 22: EU retaliates 
with $3.2 billion in 
tariffs 
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 2018 
Jul 
 July 1: Canada imposes 
tariffs on U.S. totaling 
$12.8 billion 
July 6: First phases of 
U.S. and China tariffs 
are implemented on $34 
billion goods 
July 12: U.S. 
announces $200 billion 
more tariffs 
 
 2018 
Aug 
 Aug. 1: Trump threatens 
to raise tariff rate from 
10% to 25% 
Aug. 3: China threatens 
$60 billion more in tariffs 
Aug. 7/8: U.S. and China 
release revised tariff lists 
Aug. 10: U.S. announces 
increased steel tariffs on 
Turkey 
Aug. 23: U.S. and China 
imposes second tariff 
round each worth $16 
billion at 25 percent 
 
 2018 
Sep 
 Sept 15: US announces 
additional $200 billion 
in tariffs on China 
under Section 301 
Sept. 24: US imposes 
the new Section 301 
tariffs, total U.S. tariffs 
on China total $250 
billion at 10 percent, 
China imposes $60 
billion worth at 5-10 
percent rates 
 
           
2018 
Oct 
  No new tariffs  2018 
Nov 
  No new tariffs   2018 
Dec 
 Dec. 1: U.S. and 
China announce that 
tariff rate increase 
will be stalled by 90 
days 
 
Balance of Trade 
 The first measure considered, in Figure 2, is the overall U.S. balance of trade, taking into 
account all imports and exports of goods for each given month. Based on the comparison 
between the predictive curve and the observed month-by-month 2018 balance of trade, the U.S. 
had a smaller overall deficit than expected. Since the deficit of trade is less than expected, this 
suggests that the U.S. is exporting more and/or importing less than it would in a typical year, 
absent tariffs. Further analysis of said imports and exports in Figure 3 reveals that U.S. exports to 
other countries remained close to the predicted values, so that there is no significant difference 
between predicted and observed export values for the U.S. in 2018. This suggests that the U.S. as 
a whole did not have a significant decrease in exports as a result of tariffs. However, imports to 
the U.S. did falter slightly in 2018, as the observed import values fell consistently below the 
predicted values.  
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 Figure 2: U.S. Predicted and Observed Balance of Trade  
Values shown in millions of USD 
 
 
Trade with China 
 In consideration of U.S. trade with China specifically, the balance of trade reflects that of 
the U.S. overall in that the observed deficit is smaller than the predicted. This again suggests that 
either U.S. exports to China were higher than expected or imports from China were lower. U.S. 
exports to China were only slightly under what one would expect based on the predictive curve 
and do not differ in a significant manner. These differences are also shown in Figure 3. However, 
China’s trade surplus with the U.S. grew by 17 percent, year-over-year, from 2017 to 2018, but 
that growth is lower than what would have been expected based on the predictive curve.  
This suggests that, in the trade war, China faced a greater impact in terms of volume of 
goods passing between the two countries. This could be rooted in the greater value of imports 
that the U.S. was able to target in its tariff implementation. 
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 Figure 3: U.S. Imports and Exports: Percent Difference of Observed from Predicted 
 
Trade in Specific Commodities 
Looking at specific goods can provide additional insight above the baseline total trade of the 
U.S. or with a specific country. The tariffs implemented by China on the U.S. targeted a total of 
$110 billion worth of U.S. goods including a 25 percent tariff on 2,493 products (agricultural, 
products, foods, textiles, chemicals, metal products, machinery); 20 percent on 1,078 products 
(foods, paperboard, chemicals, works of art); 10 percent on 974 products (agricultural products, 
chemicals, glassware); and 5 percent on 662 products (chemicals, machinery, medical 
equipment) (Koty and Wong). However, in consideration of U.S. exports, only two of the 
categories of goods considered appeared to have lower than expected trade values. Aluminum 
and alumina had higher than expected export values and subject to both a 25 percent tariff from 
China and a U.S. tariff (Taxation Committee). The differences between predicted and observed 
export values are illustrated in Figure 5. 
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  U.S. exports of soybeans were notably lower than predicted, as shown in Figure 4. China, 
the largest importer of soybeans, placed a 25 percent tariff on U.S. soybeans, which led to a drop 
in exports, with the largest gap from March to July. This tariff and resulting reduction accounts 
for one of the most visible impacts on U.S. citizens and producers. Soybean prices fell from the 
breakeven price for farmers, of $9.70 per bushel, to an average price of $9.28 per bushel, with 
prices reaching as low as $8.14 per bushel in September (Schroeder). The inability to sell 
soybean crops has caused crops to rot as farmers run out of storage for the excess product 
(Martin).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: U.S. Exports of Soybeans  
Values shown in millions of USD 
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 Despite the highly visible image of rotting soybeans and distressed farmers, most 
categories of U.S. exports appear relatively unaffected by the trade war. For exports of 
automotive vehicles, parts, and engines, civilian aircraft, and foods, feeds, and beverages the 
observed values were generally similar to the predicted values, so that there appears to be no 
significant difference caused by the tariffs in those exports, as seen in Figure 5. Additionally, 
exports of iron and steel mill products were greater than the predicted values for 2018. These 
larger categories of goods remaining at or above predicted values follow what was seen in the 
broader category of U.S. exports (and exports to China), which appeared relatively unaffected by 
tariffs. Overall, in 2018 U.S. exports to China grew 0.7 percent from 2017 (Tan).  
 
 
 
Figure 5: U.S. Exports: Percent Difference of Observed from Predicted 
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 Looking at similar categories of imports to the U.S., the values of trade are lower than 
predicted for many categories of goods. The observed values of imports of automotive vehicles, 
parts, and engines, bauxite and aluminum, and foods, feeds, and beverages were all significantly 
lower than their predicted values for 2018, as seen in Figure 6.  The U.S. had implemented tariffs 
on $250 billion worth of Chinese goods, out of the total $505 billion of imports from China (in 
2017), meaning nearly 50 percent of goods that would typically enter the U.S. from China were 
subject to tariffs. These tariffs covered a wide range of categories, including consumer products, 
chemical and construction materials, textiles, tools, food and agricultural products, commercial 
electronic equipment, and vehicle/automotive parts (Koty and Wong). The majority of the U.S. 
tariffs were levied at a 10 percent rate (which was slated to increase to 25 percent on January 1, 
2019, but that rate change was delayed due to progress in negotiations). A smaller number of 
tariffs were levied at 25 percent. The products covered under the U.S. tariffs were extensive but 
notably included many component parts for automobiles and several other industries, as well as 
tariffs on many agricultural products. As much as 95 percent of the goods targeted by the tariffs 
are intermediary goods, purchased by U.S. firms, not consumers (Rocca and Steil).  
The lower than expected import values suggest that the U.S. tariffs imposed on China and 
other countries had a significant impact on foreign producers’ willingness or ability to export to 
the U.S. This finding also correlates with earlier findings in total imports to the U.S. and imports 
from China, which suggested that those imports were lower than a typical year.  
Civilian aircraft, as well as iron and steel mill products differed from the other goods in 
that both had higher than expected import values. The U.S. did not specifically levy tariffs 
directly on foreign aircraft and China is not a major producer (Office of the United States Trade 
Representative). However, the U.S. did implement tariffs on steel — not only on China, but more 
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 broadly on most countries, save a few exemptions. Despite these tariffs, the domestic steel 
industry is not thriving, as steel prices have fallen back to pre-tariff levels, employment is 
stagnant, and the stock values of publicly traded steel companies are plummeting (Rocca and 
Steil). 
Figure 6: U.S. Imports: Percent Difference of Observed from Predicted 
 
Conclusions 
 In sum, these finding suggest that the U.S. was not greatly impacted by the 
implementation of tariffs by foreign countries, as U.S. exports did not fall below the predicted 
values for 2018, both more broadly and across most goods. However, some specifically targeted 
products, like soybeans, were negatively affected. On the opposite side, imports coming to the 
U.S. were significantly lower than expected, notably from China and across many categories of 
goods. This suggests that the tariffs imposed by the U.S. posed a significant barrier to foreign 
producers who were unwilling or unable to export as large a quantity as expected to the U.S. (or 
unable to export at all).  
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  However, while the U.S. reduced its trade deficit by decreasing imports and maintaining 
exports, this does not translate into improved economic status. This brand of mercantilism, which 
was President Trump’s goal with the trade war, has other negative consequences for the U.S. 
economy and its citizens, which extend beyond the scope of simple export and import values. 
For instance, with reference to Amiti, Redding, and Weinstein’s paper, the burden of the U.S. 
tariffs appears to fall entirely on the U.S. consumer. Additionally, since most of the products 
subject to U.S. tariffs are intermediate goods, U.S. companies face higher production costs, 
which can result in higher prices for the consumer. For policymakers, it is vital to understand this 
difference between the impact tariffs have on the domestic consumer/U.S. economy and the 
impact on total trade values. This paper, in combination with other research on the impact of the 
2018 trade war, suggests that improving the overall terms of trade for a country does not 
necessarily lead to improved economic status.  
Further research will be required to understand how the 2018 trade war impacted the U.S. 
economy as a whole. This paper can only conclude that tariffs levied by foreign countries did not 
significantly impact the value of U.S. exports, but the tariffs implemented by the U.S. did 
negatively impact the value of imports entering the U.S.  
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Appendix 
Table A1: Predicted vs. Observed U.S. Total Balance of Trade 
Values shown in millions of USD 
Month Predicted BoT Observed BoT 
Percent 
Difference 
Jan  -80,608 -76,447 -5% 
Feb -72,386 -61,709 -17% 
March -76,507 -60,036 -27% 
April -77,631 -66,372 -17% 
May  -85,748 -74,024 -16% 
June -91,113 -67,195 -36% 
July -95,634 -84,251 -14% 
August -103,004 -85,669 -20% 
September -99,123 -73,518 -35% 
October -94,577 -90,117 -5% 
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 November -90,968 -75,924 -20% 
December -91,189 -59,769 -53% 
 
 
 
Table A2: Predicted vs. Observed U.S. Exports 
Values shown in millions of USD 
 
Month Predicted Observed Percent Difference 
Jan 129,120 125,329 -3% 
Feb 144,329 128,098 -13% 
March 153,094 149,083 -3% 
April 147,823 137,710 -7% 
May 156,679 144,538 -8% 
June 149,636 145,110 -3% 
July 144,056 133,457 -8% 
Aug 146,771 139,637 -5% 
Sept 152,124 139,284 -9% 
Oct 140,539 146,919 4% 
Nov 188,061 140,428 -34% 
Dec 178,817 205,116 13% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A3: Predicted vs. Observed U.S. Imports 
Values shown in millions of USD 
Month Predicted Observed 
Percent 
Difference 
Jan 219,892 201,776 -9% 
Feb 221,879 189,807 -17% 
March 230,959 209,119 -10% 
April 236,329 204,081 -16% 
May 243,462 218,562 -11% 
June 239,611 212,305 -13% 
July 251,578 217,708 -16% 
Aug 244,985 225,307 -9% 
Sept 253,369 212,801 -19% 
Oct 249,536 237,036 -5% 
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 Nov 271,719 216,353 -26% 
Dec 270,950 264,885 -2% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A:4 U.S.-China Balance of Trade 
Values shown in millions of USD 
 
Month Observed Predicted 
Percent 
Difference 
Jan -35,953 -37,539 4% 
Feb -29,262 -31,541 7% 
March -25,875 -31,768 19% 
April -27,962 -34,550 19% 
May -33,187 -38,297 13% 
June -33,484 -39,902 16% 
July -36,834 -43,207 15% 
Aug -38,570 -47,537 19% 
Sept -40,243 -47,626 16% 
Oct -43,102 -45,677 6% 
Nov -37,861 -45,768 17% 
Dec -36,831 -45,860 20% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A5: U.S. Exports to China 
Values shown in millions of USD 
 
Month Predicted Observed 
Percent 
Difference 
Jan 11,327 9,835 -15% 
Feb 10,960 9,806 -12% 
March 11,261 12,382 9% 
April 11,831 10,268 -15% 
May 11,028 10,611 -4% 
June 11,322 11,116 -2% 
July 10,725 10,262 -5% 
Aug 10,285 9,294 -11% 
Sept 9,881 9,789 -1% 
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 Oct 9,723 9,131 -6% 
Nov 9,492 8,665 -10% 
Dec 9,441 9,183 -3% 
 
 
 
Table A6: U.S. Imports from China 
Values shown in millions of USD 
Month Predicted Observed 
Percent 
Difference 
Jan 53,235 45,788 -16% 
Feb 47,581 39,068 -22% 
March 45,457 38,257 -19% 
April 48,033 38,230 -26% 
May 52,312 43,797 -19% 
June 54,096 44,599 -21% 
July 55,981 47,096 -19% 
Aug 57,172 47,864 -19% 
Sept 61,874 50,032 -24% 
Oct 61,032 52,233 -17% 
Nov 55,038 46,526 -18% 
Dec 58,643 46,013 -27% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A7: U.S. Exports of Various Goods 
Values shown in millions of USD 
 
Product Month Predicted  Observed  
Percent 
Difference 
Aluminum and alumina Jan 582 696 16% 
Aluminum and alumina Feb 629 736 15% 
Aluminum and alumina Mar 646 736 12% 
Aluminum and alumina Apr 658 797 17% 
Aluminum and alumina May 631 760 17% 
Aluminum and alumina Jun 601 738 19% 
Aluminum and alumina Jul 566 726 22% 
Aluminum and alumina Aug 549 692 21% 
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 Aluminum and alumina Sep 572 680 16% 
Aluminum and alumina Oct 570 704 19% 
Aluminum and alumina Nov 568 742 23% 
Aluminum and alumina Dec 587 730 20% 
Automotive vehicles, parts, and engines Jan 14,688 13,901 -6% 
Automotive vehicles, parts, and engines Feb 15,006 14,825 -1% 
Automotive vehicles, parts, and engines Mar 14,548 14,180 -3% 
Automotive vehicles, parts, and engines Apr 13,981 13,919 0% 
Automotive vehicles, parts, and engines May 13,584 13,558 0% 
Automotive vehicles, parts, and engines Jun 13,180 12,850 -3% 
Automotive vehicles, parts, and engines Jul 13,330 13,068 -2% 
Automotive vehicles, parts, and engines Aug 13,212 12,780 -3% 
Automotive vehicles, parts, and engines Sep 12,966 12,948 0% 
Automotive vehicles, parts, and engines Oct 12,806 12,727 -1% 
Automotive vehicles, parts, and engines Nov 13,075 12,336 -6% 
Automotive vehicles, parts, and engines Dec 13,079 12,314 -6% 
Civilian aircraft Jan 4,701 3,761 -25% 
Civilian aircraft Feb 4,434 3,988 -11% 
Civilian aircraft Mar 5,246 5,926 11% 
Civilian aircraft Apr 4,919 3,350 -47% 
Civilian aircraft May 5,101 5,242 3% 
Civilian aircraft Jun 4,233 5,033 16% 
Civilian aircraft Jul 3,931 3,465 -13% 
Civilian aircraft Aug 4,495 3,981 -13% 
Civilian aircraft Sep 5,535 5,160 -7% 
Civilian aircraft Oct 5,606 4,852 -16% 
Civilian aircraft Nov 5,543 5,849 5% 
Civilian aircraft Dec 5,457 4,891 -12% 
Foods, feeds, and beverages Jan 10,522 10,737 2% 
Foods, feeds, and beverages Feb 10,855 10,746 -1% 
Foods, feeds, and beverages Mar 12,323 11,825 -4% 
Foods, feeds, and beverages Apr 13,715 12,414 -10% 
Foods, feeds, and beverages May 14,776 14,097 -5% 
Foods, feeds, and beverages Jun 14,300 14,063 -2% 
Foods, feeds, and beverages Jul 13,056 13,175 1% 
Foods, feeds, and beverages Aug 11,586 12,028 4% 
Foods, feeds, and beverages Sep 10,773 11,010 2% 
Foods, feeds, and beverages Oct 10,847 10,340 -5% 
Foods, feeds, and beverages Nov 10,388 10,446 1% 
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 Foods, feeds, and beverages Dec 10,192 9600 -6% 
Iron and steel mill products Jan 618 825 25% 
Iron and steel mill products Feb 645 864 25% 
Iron and steel mill products Mar 639 833 23% 
Iron and steel mill products Apr 705 895 21% 
Iron and steel mill products May 636 837 24% 
Iron and steel mill products Jun 572 904 37% 
Iron and steel mill products Jul 452 704 36% 
Iron and steel mill products Aug 425 677 37% 
Iron and steel mill products Sep 438 663 34% 
Iron and steel mill products Oct 445 659 33% 
Iron and steel mill products Nov 401 692 42% 
Iron and steel mill products Dec 439 657 33% 
Soybeans Jan 1,807 1381 -31% 
Soybeans Feb 1,775 1328 -34% 
Soybeans Mar 2,782 1845 -51% 
Soybeans Apr 4,203 2185 -92% 
Soybeans May 5,802 4142 -40% 
Soybeans Jun 5,783 4210 -37% 
Soybeans Jul 5,022 3528 -42% 
Soybeans Aug 3,237 2581 -25% 
Soybeans Sep 2,214 1785 -24% 
Soybeans Oct 1,896 948 -100% 
Soybeans Nov 889 875 -2% 
Soybeans Dec 1,594 298 -435% 
 
 
 
Table A8: U.S. Imports of Various Goods 
Values shown in millions of USD 
Product Month Predicted  Observed  
Percent 
Difference 
Automotive vehicles, parts, and engines Jan 36,732 30,913 -19% 
Automotive vehicles, parts, and engines Feb 36,593 31,088 -18% 
Automotive vehicles, parts, and engines Mar 35,915 31,301 -15% 
Automotive vehicles, parts, and engines Apr 35,008 30,003 -17% 
Automotive vehicles, parts, and engines May 35,138 29,728 -18% 
Automotive vehicles, parts, and engines Jun 36,129 30,211 -20% 
Automotive vehicles, parts, and engines Jul 36,553 30,710 -19% 
Automotive vehicles, parts, and engines Aug 37,261 31,711 -18% 
Automotive vehicles, parts, and engines Sep 37,568 31,107 -21% 
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 Automotive vehicles, parts, and engines Oct 37,653 31,839 -18% 
Automotive vehicles, parts, and engines Nov 37,738 32,083 -18% 
Automotive vehicles, parts, and engines Dec 38,440 32,133 -20% 
Bauxite and aluminum Jan 1,959 1,456 -35% 
Bauxite and aluminum Feb 2,013 1,375 -46% 
Bauxite and aluminum Mar 2,075 1,429 -45% 
Bauxite and aluminum Apr 1,987 1,485 -34% 
Bauxite and aluminum May 1,943 1,394 -39% 
Bauxite and aluminum Jun 1,904 1,250 -52% 
Bauxite and aluminum Jul 1,990 1,411 -41% 
Bauxite and aluminum Aug 1,946 1,326 -47% 
Bauxite and aluminum Sep 1,961 1,349 -45% 
Bauxite and aluminum Oct 1,970 1,333 -48% 
Bauxite and aluminum Nov 1,979 1,335 -48% 
Bauxite and aluminum Dec 1,977 1,331 -48% 
Civilian aircraft Jan 651 462 -41% 
Civilian aircraft Feb 994 912 -9% 
Civilian aircraft Mar 1,051 1,414 26% 
Civilian aircraft Apr 961 1,096 12% 
Civilian aircraft May 995 973 -2% 
Civilian aircraft Jun 922 1,190 22% 
Civilian aircraft Jul 682 1,031 34% 
Civilian aircraft Aug 647 778 17% 
Civilian aircraft Sep 725 760 5% 
Civilian aircraft Oct 722 996 27% 
Civilian aircraft Nov 720 936 23% 
Civilian aircraft Dec 1,054 1,390 24% 
Foods, feeds, and beverages Jan 14,353 11,871 -21% 
Foods, feeds, and beverages Feb 14,671 12,643 -16% 
Foods, feeds, and beverages Mar 14,534 12,227 -19% 
Foods, feeds, and beverages Apr 14,526 12,274 -18% 
Foods, feeds, and beverages May 14,675 12,378 -19% 
Foods, feeds, and beverages Jun 14,690 12,175 -21% 
Foods, feeds, and beverages Jul 14,745 12,440 -19% 
Foods, feeds, and beverages Aug 14,717 12,305 -20% 
Foods, feeds, and beverages Sep 14,662 12,143 -21% 
Foods, feeds, and beverages Oct 14,697 12,299 -20% 
Foods, feeds, and beverages Nov 14,733 12,153 -21% 
Foods, feeds, and beverages Dec 15,034 12,583 -19% 
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 Iron and steel mill products Jan 1,202 1,501 20% 
Iron and steel mill products Feb 1,477 1,531 4% 
Iron and steel mill products Mar 1,695 1,812 6% 
Iron and steel mill products Apr 1,543 2,054 25% 
Iron and steel mill products May 1,337 1,820 27% 
Iron and steel mill products Jun 1,279 1,479 13% 
Iron and steel mill products Jul 1,400 1,697 18% 
Iron and steel mill products Aug 1,452 1,770 18% 
Iron and steel mill products Sep 1,364 1,710 20% 
Iron and steel mill products Oct 1,359 1,778 24% 
Iron and steel mill products Nov 1,355 1,611 16% 
Iron and steel mill products Dec 1,182 1,379 14% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A1: U.S. Total Exports 
Values shown in millions of USD 
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Figure A2: U.S. Total Imports 
Values shown in millions of USD 
 
 
Figure A3: U.S. Exports to China 
Values shown in millions of USD 
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Figure A4: U.S. Imports from China 
Values shown in millions of USD 
 
Figure A5: U.S. Exports of Aluminum  
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 Values shown in millions of USD 
 
 
 
 
Figure A6: U.S. Exports of Automotive Vehicles, Parts, and Engines 
Values shown in millions of USD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A7: U.S. Exports of Civilian Aircraft 
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 Values shown in millions of USD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A8: U.S. Exports of Foods, Feeds, and Beverages 
Values shown in millions of USD 
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Figure A9: U.S. Exports of Iron and Steel Mill Products 
Values shown in millions of USD 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A10: U.S. Imports of Automotive Vehicles, Parts, and Engines 
Values shown in millions of USD 
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Figure A11: U.S. Imports of Bauxite and Aluminum 
Values shown in millions of USD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A12: U.S. Imports of Civilian Aircraft 
Values shown in millions of USD 
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Figure A13: U.S. Imports of Foods, Feeds, and Beverages 
Values shown in millions of USD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A14: U.S. Imports of Iron and Steel Mill Products 
Values shown in millions of USD 
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